• Page 35, line 12: "all successors of a i k−1 from the list of a j k ," −→ "all successors a r of a i k−1 from the list of a j k , and deleting a j k from the list of a r ,". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 39, line -8: add "Let A M denote the set of applicants who are assigned in M ." to the end of this paragraph.
• Page 41, lines -7 to -6: add 'who are not indifferent between the two matchings" after "preferred by the majority of the applicants". • Page 138, Algorithm 3.1, add "Require: SMTI instance I", "Ensure: return a weakly stable matching M in I such that |M | ≥ 2 3 s + (I)". • Page 139, Algorithm 3.2, under line "Require:", add "Ensure: w j rejects m i ".
• Page 147, line -10: "prefers r i to r k " −→ "prefers r k to r i ". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 149, line 2: delete "Pareto".
• Page 149, line 3: "resident-Pareto" −→ "resident-optimal weakly".
• Page 149, line 4: "resident-Pareto" −→ "resident-optimal".
• Page 149, line 5: "matching M ′ " −→ "weakly stable matching M ′ ".
• Page 149, line 12: "resident-Pareto stable" −→ "resident-optimal".
• Page 149, line 14: "resident-Pareto" −→ "resident-optimal weakly".
• Page 149, line 20: "resident-Pareto" −→ "resident-optimal weakly".
• Page 149, line 22: "resident-Pareto" −→ "resident-optimal".
• Page 149, line 25: "resident-Pareto" −→ "resident-optimal weakly".
• Page 149, line -7: add "Note that an instance of sm may not admit a stable matching that is Pareto optimal for the men -see Sec. 5.7.3."
• Page 158, line -6: "fewest" −→ "minimum". Chapter 4
• References to the Tan-Hsueh algorithm should be in the index.
• Similarly all references to the Roth-Vande Vate algorithm should be in the index (note that the term "Roth-Vande Vate Mechanism" is used in Chapter 2). • Page 216, line -4: "an many-many extension" −→ "a many-many extension". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 246, Definition 5.13: the first sentence of Case (3) should read "it involves a couple (r i , r j ) ∈ R C and a pair of (not necessarily distinct) hospitals h k , h l ∈ H such that h k = M (r i ), h l = M (r j ), (r i , r j ) finds (h k , h l ) acceptable, and either (r i , r j ) is unmatched or prefers (h k , h l ) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and either ".
• Page 248, Theorem 5.15: "every distinct pair of hospitals" −→ "every ordered pair of distinct hospitals".
• Page 251, line -10: "In fact, consistent preference lists need not be responsive" −→ "In fact, responsive preference lists need not be consistent". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 254, caption of Figure 5 .8: "HRIC" −→ "HRS".
• Page 255, line -15: "all possible" −→ "acceptable".
• Page 255, line -14: "the each" −→ "each".
• Page 255, line -10: "in general exponential" −→ "in the worst case exponential in". If a man m i proposes to a woman w j where (m i , w j ) is marked as ineligible, the procedure is as per lines 4-6 and 8-13 of Algorithm 5.2 (subject to the modifications to line 11 as described), but following any deletions and pairs being marked as ineligible, the pair (m i , w j ) is not added to M but is instead deleted. This is as • Page 312, lines 11-15: delete from "One way of proving this" up to the end of the paragraph, and replace with "A similar result holds for matchings in a graph: that is, a given graph G admits a maximal matching of size k, for each k such that β − (G) ≤ k ≤ β + (G) [276] ." (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 313, line -13: insert "in" after "better off".
• Page 315, line 10: the case where r = 1 should be dealt with separately. In this case, each of a i 0 and h k is unassigned, and h k ∈ A(a i 0 ). (Due to Baharak Rastegari.)
• Page 315, lines 24-27: replace by the following. Given an improving coalition C, let M ′ be the matching
Then M ′′ is defined to be the matching obtained from M by satisfying C, where • Page 317: the statement prior to Proposition 6.14 is incorrect. It is open as to whether the time complexity stated in Proposition 6.14 is true. However note that in an instance I of hat in which every applicant's preference list comprises a single tie, the Pareto optimal matchings in I are precisely the maximum matchings in the underlying graph G. Thus an O(m) algorithm for finding a Pareto optimal matching in I would imply an O(m) algorithm to find a maximum matching in an arbitrary bipartite graph. (Due to Baharak Rastegari.)
• Page 320, lines 2-4: the sentence beginning "Also M is trade-in-free" should read "Also M is trade-in-free if there is no applicant-house pair (a i , h j ) such that a i is assigned in M , h j is undersubscribed in M and a i prefers h j to M (a i )." (Due to Andre Veski.)
• Page 321, lines 3 and 9 of Algorithm 6.3: A should be A M . (Due to Zhiyuan Lin.)
• Page 322, after line 7 of Algorithm 6.4: add "if (Q = ∅) then remove head(Q) from L k " -this is to prevent a t = head(Q) having h k removed from its list, because a t will be promoted to h k at the next iteration of the while loop. (Due to Zhiyuan Lin.)
• Page 323, line 19: "who a j envies" −→ "whom a j envies". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 325, line 16: "mxaimum" −→ "maximum". (Due toÁgnes Cseh.)
• Page 404, line 8: "1 ≤ s < β" −→ "1 ≤ s ≤ β". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
• Page 404, lines -9 and -8: "Let O ′ r be the vector p 1 , . . . , p r , where p k = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1) and p r = n + 1." −→ "Let O + r be the vector p + 1 , . . . , p + r , where p + k = 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ r − 1) and p + r = n 1 + 1." • Page 404, lines -8, -3: O ′ r −→ O + r . • Page 409, line -17: "such each paper" −→ "such that each paper". (Due to Mechthild Opperud.)
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